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REFERENTIAL MEANING: THE STATIC ASPECTS
Reed Dickerson
Indiana University School of Law
To clarify the relationship between a word and the thing to which it is assumed
to refer, Ogden and Richardsl constructed the following diagram:
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This diagram has been useful in helping to make clear that the relationship
between a word and the thing to which it is assumed to refer is neither
God-given nor inherent in nature. Rather, it is a relationship that exists only
because the members of the speech community concerned have habitually used
the word to refer to that thing. Thus, the word "court" carries the meaning that
it does only because it is habitually so used. That convention and ultimately
general usage provide the connecting link is expressed by making the base of the
triangle, which connects symbol with thing ("referent"), a broken line. The solid
connection between the two is thus made only through thought ("reference"),
which forms the apex of the triangle. The diagram also suggests that the
relationship of symbol to user or hearer is, in at least some respects, a causal one.
Despite its value for these purposes, the diagram appears to have serious
inadequacies. First, it suggests that the relationship between symbol and thing
("referent") is as significant as the relationship between symbol and concept of
the thing ("reference"). If a symbol is viewed as ultimately designating a thing,
meaning would be thwarted whenever nothing corresponding to the particular
concept actually existed, unless there was a shift at that point to the assumption
that in such a case the symbol designated, instead, the concept of the thing.
Would it not make simpler and more consistent sense simply to say that in all
1. OGDEN AND RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANINGS (N.Y., Harcourt, Brace &
Co., 10th ed., 1949), at 11.
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cases the symbol refers to the thought, even though it may seem unnatural when
the object corresponding to the thought is physically observable? Certainly, the
meaning of the sentence, "You will find a consumer protection act in the 1969
Session Laws" is the same whether or not such an act is included in that volume.
Second, the left side of the triangle must, as a consequence, do double
duty-once for the non-causal relationship between symbol and thought just
discussed, and again for the causal. Unfortunately, the two cannot be
differentiated in such a diagram.
Third, the diagram suggests that the relationship between thought and
symbol, represented by the left side of the traingle, is similar to that between
thought and referent, represented by the right. Whereas the relationship between
thought and symbol is in one of its aspects a causal one whose direction depends
on whether the thought is that of the sender or that of the receiver, the
relationship between thought and thing is sometimes causal and sometimes not,
and, where it is, it is a one-way relationship in which the thing provokes the
thought (through the process of perception) whereas the thought does not
provoke the thing.
Fourth, in using the right side of a symmetrical traingle to represent the
relationship between thought and thing, Ogden and Richards seem to treat as
coordinate with the relationship(s) between symbol and thought a relationship
that falls within the area of epistemology. This relationship lies outside the field
of meaning in the referential sense, and beyond the reach of the metalanguage,
which is the language used to talk about language.
Fifth, the diagram takes no account of the relationships among symbols.
To place these elements in more useful perspective within the general theory
of meaning, sometimes called "semiotic," the following diagram is offered as an
amplification of and possible improvement on that of Ogden and Richards:
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In the terminology of the revised diagram, "concept" (designatum) replaces
"'thought or reference" and "thing" (denotatum) replaces "referent."
Aspect I is the relationship between symbols. Under the general classifica-
tion developed by C.S. Pierce and his recent disciple, Charles W. Morris, this is
the "syntactical" dimension of semiotic. For example, the statement that 'juge"
is French for "judge" lies in the domain of syntactics. Soe does the problem of
the squinting modifier and other forms of syntactic ambiguity. It is largely the
area in which mathematics and deductive logic operate. It is described in the
metalanguage.
Aspect 2 is the subjective, two-way causal relationship between a symbol and
its corresponding concept, the tendency of minds to use or respond to particular
symbols in particular ways. The tendency of minds to use a symbol in a
particular way is based on habit. The tendency of minds to respond to a symbol
in a particular way is based on a special kind of habit-the conditioned reflex.
This is the "pragmatical" dimension of semiotic. It is largely the area in which
"general semantics" operates. It is the area in which the abuse of stipulative
definition called "Humpty-Dumptyism" operates. It is described in the
matalanguage.
Aspect 3 is the objective, non-causal relationship, resulting from habitual use
in Aspect 2, that exists between a symbol and the concept that it refers to. This
is the "semantical" dimension of semiotic, represented by the dictionary ("Bill
of Attainder means . . ."). It is described in the metalanguage. It is here that the
diagram differs most significantly from that of Ogden and Richards.
Aspect 4 is the imputed relationship between a symbol and the existing
physical object or activity (denotation), if any, corresponding to the concept
that the symbol refers to in Aspect 3. This is a variant of the semantical
dimension (Aspect 3). Because the existence or non-existence of the object or
activity concerned is generally irrelevant to problems of meaning, the relation-
ship adds nothing to Aspect 3. Indeed, it has no significance for semiotic and is
beyond its reach.
Aspect 5 is the one-way causal relationship between an existing object or
activity ("denotation") and its corresponding concept. For example, a building
may generate in the viewer the idea of the state capitol; but the converse is not
true. The relationship is described in the languages of psychology and
philosophy (epistemology). It is beyond the reach of semiotic.
Aspect 6 is the relationship between two concepts. For example, the concept
of default is closely linked with that of foreclosure. The mental relationship is
described in the language of psychology. It is beyond the reach of semiotic.
Aspect 7 is the relationship between two existing objects or activities
(denotata). For example, the House of Representatives and Senate must pass the
identical bill if it is to become law. The relationship is described in the object
language. It is beyond the reach of semiotic.
Where concept A and concept B (designata of specific denotata) are
members of the same class (which is inherently conceptual), Aspect 8 is the
range of characteristics that define the class. These comprise the subjective
"connotation" or "intension" of the symbol designating the class. They are
ordinarily represented by a connotative definition ("'child' means a person who
has not attained his 21st birthday"). They are described in the metalanguage.
Where thing A and thing B (denotata) are members of the same class, Aspect
9 is the range of characteristics that define the class. They are the objective
description of connotation or intension in the subjective sense.
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Aspect 10 consists of the particular concepts (designata) that comprise the
total thought expressed by the communication. They are described in the
language of psychology.
Aspect 11 consists of the particular objects or activities (denotata), if any,
that correspond to the particular concepts that comprise Aspect 10. They are
described in the object language. They have no significance for semiotic and are
beyond its reach.
Whatever its possible merits, this diagram must not be viewed as portraying
all the elements that control or affect meaning. It is as much like a full-blown
theory of meaning as a photograph of a garaged racing car is like the Indianapolis
"500" race. It represents, in static form, basic elements that taken alone would
constitute some of the tools of a very primitive language. The language of
current use, on the other hand, is not confined to words that name concepts that
correspond to objects. Moreover, because the conveyance of meaning depends
largely on the dynamics of particular use, we must add the factors of context
and its integrating force of purpose. But, despite these omissions, the diagram
may help to illumine several elements basic to the total concept of referential
meaning in communication.
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